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Abstract
In many mainstream macroeconomic models, sticky prices play an important role in explaining
the effects of monetary policy on the economy. Various theories have been set forth to explain
why prices are sticky. This study takes a ﬁrm-level survey approach, in a spirit similar to Blinder
et al. (1998), to shed some light on the question of why prices are sticky. In particular, the Bank of
Canada’s regional ofﬁces surveyed 170 Canadian ﬁrms for their views on price dynamics. The
authors ﬁnd that the most important motivators of price changes are price changes by competitors,
changes in domestic input costs, and changes in demand. Surprisingly, but consistent with the
results reported in Bils and Klenow (2002), the survey evidence suggests that more than 50 per
cent of ﬁrms change their prices more than four times a year. Moreover, the survey indicates that
prices change more frequently than they did ten years ago, because of more intense competition
and advances in information technology.
JEL classiﬁcation: D40, E30, L11
Bank classiﬁcation: Inﬂation and prices; Transmission of monetary policy
Résumé
Nombreux sont les modèles macroéconomiques dans lesquels la rigidité des prix sert de clef à
l’interprétation des effets de la politique monétaire sur l’économie. Différentes théories ont été
mises en avant pour expliquer cette rigidité. Les auteurs abordent la question à la manière de
Blinder et coll. (1998), par la voie d’une enquête. Plus précisément, ils se fondent sur l’enquête
que les bureaux régionaux de la Banque du Canada ont menée auprès de 170 entreprises
canadiennes en vue de recueillir leurs points de vue sur la dynamique des prix. Les auteurs
constatent que les modiﬁcations de prix sont principalement motivées par celles qu’effectuent les
concurrents, par les variations du coût des intrants intérieurs et par les variations de la demande.
Fait étonnant, mais qui est conforme aux résultats de Bils et Klenow (2002), plus de la moitié des
entreprises rajusteraient leurs prix au moins quatre fois par an d’après les données de l’enquête.
En outre, l’intensiﬁcation de la concurrence et les progrès des technologies de l’information
auraient amené les ﬁrmes à réviser leurs prix plus souvent qu’elles ne le faisaient il y a dix ans.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D40, E30, L11
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Inﬂation et prix; Transmission de la politique monétaire1
1. Introduction
Setting prices correctly plays a critical role in determining the success of a product or service for
a ﬁrm. The process of choosing and setting the ‘right’ price is, however, costly in many ways. The
time and effort spent by senior staff to set prices and the cost of communicating the price changes
to clients are non-trivial. As well, if customers are unhappy with the new price, the ﬁrm may incur
negotiation costs, or may lose customers.
Firms’ attempts to minimize these costs by allowing market prices to remain unchanged, even
though market circumstances might dictate price changes, inﬂuence how monetary policy affects
the economy. The extent to which prices are unchanged is referred to as price stickiness, rigidity,
inertia, or inﬂexibility.
This paper examines the main results of a survey of the pricing behaviour of Canadian companies
and is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the motivation for surveying ﬁrms and the
methodology used in setting up the questionnaire and conducting the interviews. Section 3
presents results pertaining to the frequency with which ﬁrms adjust prices and what motivates
them to do so. Section 4 highlights our evaluation of ten sticky-price theories based on the survey
results. Section 5 provides a summary of the main ﬁndings and discusses some potential
implications for monetary policy. Appendix A contains a copy of the questionnaire used to
interview ﬁrms. Appendix B reviews how ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence the selection of a
particular theory of price stickiness.
2. Research MotivationandMethodology
2.1 The importance of price determination for monetary policy
The way ﬁrms set prices is of major importance to the design and implementation of monetary
policy. Whether prices are sticky—that is, whether they respond slowly to changes in the
economic environment—or whether they respond asymmetrically to excess demand and excess
supply are key questions for central banks. The answers have implications for the conduct of
monetary policy, such as the speed with which the monetary authorities attempt to bring inﬂation
back to the target after a shock. They also shape the process by which changes in monetary policy
are transmitted to real activity and to inﬂation.
Views on the importance of price stickiness as a central question in macroeconomics have varied
over the years. In the 1960s and 1970s, economists generally accepted the presence of sticky
prices and their ability to generate real-side disturbances in the face of monetary policy shocks. In2
the latter 1970s and the 1980s, much of the academic research focused on the real side of the
economy. The main economic paradigms at the time, the early rational expectations and real
business cycle models, argued against the presence of sticky prices and therefore against a role for
monetary policy in stimulating growth during periods of slack demand. This probably reﬂected
the lack of conclusive evidence on the extent and importance of sticky prices.
In contrast, the macroeconomic literature of the 1990s and 2000s has seen a general acceptance of
price stickiness and the important role monetary policy can play in an economy running below
potential. There have been a growing number of studies devoted to assessing the degree of price
stickiness. Many of the earlier studies found considerable rigidity in price setting. For example,
Cecchetti (1986) uses a sample of 38 U.S. magazines to show that even during periods of high
inﬂation, only 30 per cent of the sample, on average, changed prices within a given year. Carlton
(1986) examines changes in prices of intermediate products used in 11 different manufacturing
groups and calculates average price durations ranging from 6 to 19 months, depending on product
category. Kashyap (1995) analyzes the prices of 12 items in three U.S. mail-order catalogues and
estimates an average price duration of 15 months. However, Bils and Klenow (2002), using
disaggregated Bureau of Labor Statistics price data for the United States, ﬁnd price adjustment to
be more ﬂexible than in these earlier studies and compute a median price duration of four months.
2.2 A survey approach to studying price determination
An approach that has become increasingly popular in trying to shed light on these issues is to
survey ﬁrms directly on how they set prices. The use of surveys to analyze the price-setting
behaviour of ﬁrms was pioneered in the United States by Blinder (1991, 1994) and Blinder et al.
(1998). Subsequent price-setting surveys were conducted by researchers at the Bank of England
(Hall, Walsh, and Yates 1997), the Bank of Japan (Nakagawa, Hattori, and Takagawa 2000), and
the Bank of Sweden (Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten 2001); more recently, nine euro area central
banks have conducted price-setting surveys (Italy, Belgium, Germany, France, Spain,
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Austria) (Fabiani et al. 2005). This working paper
reports on the results of the ﬁrst such survey for Canada.
There are several reasons why surveys of ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour have been growing in
popularity among researchers. Most important is the recognition of the central role played by the
relative stickiness of prices in inﬂuencing how changes in monetary policy affect real economic
variables such as output and employment. As well, conventional approaches to investigating price
stickiness, based upon econometric analysis of aggregate time-series data, have not yet been able3
to resolve many of the outstanding issues.1 Moreover, new theories for sluggish price adjustment
have appeared before older explanations have been satisfactorily rejected (Blinder et al. 1998, 7).
There is also growing recognition that price stickiness can be best understood by examining
pricing behaviours at the micro level, where pricing decisions are actually made. However, until
the release of ﬁrm-based survey studies in recent years, the scope of earlier micro-level studies
was too narrow—either focusing on a single ﬁrm, a single market, or a limited range of
products—to draw implications for price stickiness in the broader economy.
As indicated earlier, other researchers have already conducted well-diversiﬁed, ﬁrm-based
surveys of the price-setting process using the interview method pioneered by Blinder. However,
until now such a survey had not yet been done in Canada. Surveying price-setting behaviour at
Canadian ﬁrms was expected to be a useful contribution given that differences in the structure of
the Canadian economy, such as its export exposure, industrial mix, and institutional and market
arrangements, might yield results different from those in other countries.
In addition to assessing the relative ﬂexibility of price adjustment in Canada, a ﬁrm-based survey
can be used to examine various explanations for slow price adjustment and the prevalence of these
explanations across ﬁrms. This information might be important for the conduct of monetary
policy in so far as different explanations of price rigidity may have different effects on the
responsiveness of prices to changing demand conditions. Macroeconomic modelling may also
beneﬁt from more detailed information on ﬁrm price-setting behaviour.
2.3 Sample and survey design
The design and implementation of the ﬁrm survey for Canada drew upon the results and lessons
learned from previous price-setting studies carried out in other countries. This survey involved
structured interviews of 170 ﬁrms across the country. Firms selected for inclusion in the survey
had to meet very speciﬁc criteria. The ﬁrst criterion was to include only private and for-proﬁt
ﬁrms, because theories of price stickiness were developed to explain the behaviour of proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms, not public sector or non-proﬁt ﬁrms. The second criterion was that these ﬁrms
also had to be unregulated; that is, they had to be able to set their prices autonomously in response
to market conditions, rather than have their prices imposed by some regulatory body or offshore
parent. Finally, the ﬁrms’ main activity could not be the sale of primary commodities. Such ﬁrms
were excluded because they are typically price-takers and have no inﬂuence on commodity prices,
which move freely in response to demand and supply pressures in international markets. Thus, the
1. Fora fullerdiscussion, see Blinder etal.(1998,8–12).4
sampled ﬁrms represented pricing behaviour in the private, for-proﬁt, unregulated, non-primary
sector of the Canadian economy, which accounted for about 70 per cent of Canada’s output
in 2002.2
To ensure that the sample was representative of this portion of the Canadian economy, the
distribution of ﬁrms within the sample by industry sector and employment size was constructed to
match closely the proportions prevailing in the actual economy for these two categories (Table 1).
Industry classiﬁcations were based on Statistics Canada’s North American Industry Classiﬁcation
System (NAICS) codes. The categories used for organizing ﬁrms by size were: (i) under
100 employees, (ii) 100 to 499 employees, and (iii) 500 employees and over. Although some
2. This calculation excludesone-halfofthe outputin thereal estate sector relatedtoimputed rent.
Table 1: Comparing the Bank of Canada Survey with Three Previous Studies
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attempt was made to make the regional distribution of ﬁrms in the sample match the regional
shares of Canadian real output, this strategy was of secondary importance given the low
likelihood that price setting for a given industry or ﬁrm size would vary across regions. However,
except for some oversampling in Atlantic Canada and some undersampling in Ontario, the
number of ﬁrms surveyed corresponded roughly to regional size (Table 2). The sample size was
limited to 170 ﬁrms in order to contain surveying costs, but, at the same time, to ensure a
minimum sample size for drawing statistical inferences at more disaggregated levels, such as by
industry or by ﬁrm size.
Drawing upon the experience of the Bank of Canada’s regional ofﬁces in conducting ﬁrm-based
surveys, a non-random form of sampling widely employed in business surveys and known as
“quota sampling”3 was used to generate a representative sample of ﬁrms. All surveys were
completed using face-to-face interviews rather than by telephone, mail, fax, or the Internet, in the
belief that survey responses would be more reliable.4 All interviewers were Bank of Canada staff
economists who had training in clarifying concepts, ensuring that all questions were answered,
and identifying and resolving any inconsistencies in responses. Company representatives who
participated in the survey held senior positions, suggesting that they would know how their ﬁrm’s
products or services were priced.5 Survey interviews were conducted from July 2002 to
March 2003. However, about two-thirds of the surveys were completed between January and
March 2003, a period when the Canadian dollar appreciated by about 7 per cent, and the rate of
inﬂation, as measured by the 12-month rate of increase in the consumer price index (CPI), rose to
an average of 4.4 per cent, from less than 3 per cent when surveying commenced in July 2002.6
3. See Martin (2004) for a description of the Bank of Canada’s regional ofﬁces’ survey experience. The
non-random sampling used in the reghonal ofﬁces and in the price survey is called “quota sampling”
because for a given subgroup in a target universe, a “quota” of respondents is selected which, when
aggregated, is intended to produce a sample that is representative of the target universe. Thus, in
instances where an initial company contact chooses not to participate in the survey, another ﬁrm with
comparable industry or ﬁrm-size characteristics is selected from commercial business directories to
achievesample targets.See alsoOECD(2003,21–23).
4. Blinder et al. (1998) believe that personal interviews conducted by knowledgeable economic
professionals will improve the quality of survey results. Our experience with missing responses and
errors in questionnaires sent in by fax suggests that Blinder et al.’s preference for personal interviews
is wellfounded.
5. The percentage distribution of company contacts is as follows: president, CEO, or owner, 22 per cent;
vice-president, vice-president of ﬁnance, or CFO, 41 per cent; manager or director, 22 per cent;
controller, 9 per cent.
6. The rise in total CPI inﬂation resulted mainly from energy and auto insurance price increases.
Excluding these components, the year-over-year increase in consumer prices averaged 2.3 per cent
fromJanuary to March 2003.6
The price-setting survey was based upon a structured questionnaire rather than a free-form
interview to allow for standard statistical analysis (see Appendix A for a copy of the survey). The
number, type, and phrasing of the questions as well as the layout of the survey were ﬁnalized in
consultation with Bank of Canada senior management and Research Department staff.
Consideration was given to striking a reasonable balance between gathering pertinent information
and not overburdening the respondents. Given that most ﬁrms sell a variety of products, ﬁrms
were requested to respond to the survey questions with reference to their main product. If product
offerings were too dispersed to easily identify one main product (e.g., department store),
respondents were asked to answer the questions with reference to some broad product category
where items are priced similarly (e.g., electronic equipment).
Table 2: Representativeness of the Survey Sample
Industry sectora
a. “Target” is the percentage of real GDP in the private, non-regulated, non-primary sector excluding one-half of
the real estate sector for imputed rent. It constituted 68 per cent of total real GDP in 2002. “Actual” is the
percentage of ﬁrms in the price-survey sample.
Firm sizeb
b. “Target” is the percentage of employment in a particular ﬁrm-size category in 2002 as estimated by Statistics
Canada’s Survey of Employment, Payroll and Hours. “Actual” is the percentage of the number of ﬁrms in the
price-survey sample.
Regionc
c. “Target” is the percentage of real GDP in 2002. “Actual” is the percentage of the number of ﬁrms in the price-
survey sample.
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual
Construction 10 10
Manufacturing 25 26
Wholesale and retail trade 17 14
Transportation, information & cultural
industries 11 13










British Columbia 12 167
The survey questionnaire consisted of three sections. The ﬁrst section contained questions on ﬁrm
characteristics such as cost structure, industry, sales distribution by customer type and region,
share of sales under contract, customer concentration, and the number of direct competitors.
These questions were added to allow for a more detailed analysis of why price-setting behaviour
varies across ﬁrms. A comparison of key ﬁrm characteristics by industry is presented in Table 3.
These characteristics provide a useful proﬁle of each industry sector and its unique features. For
example, our survey reveals that 95 per cent of construction ﬁrms surveyed depend on activity
generated in their home region, whereas manufacturing ﬁrms were most likely to be export-
oriented. Furthermore, the cost structure of construction ﬁrms tends to be skewed towards variable
costs (material and labour costs being the bulk of total costs).
Table 3: Selected Firm Characteristics by Industry Sector
Feature Total Cons. Mfg. Trade
Info&
transa
a. Information and cultural industries, and transportation and warehousing
FIREb
b. Finance, insurance, and real estate
Servicesc
c. Business and personal services, food and accommodation services
Number of observations 170 17 45 25 22 27 34
Variable cost as portion of total cost 63% 79% 67% 76% 50% 50% 61%
Sales to home region (% of total sales)d
d. The difference between sales to the home region and exports is domestic sales outside their home region.
60% 95% 32% 68% 68% 73% 57%
Sales exported (% of total sales)d 19% 3% 45% 6% 10% 4% 21%
Sales to businesses (% of total sales) 60% 49% 74% 44% 80% 54% 51%
Sales under contract (% of total sales) 52% 78% 51% 20% 60% 77% 39%
Five largest buyers amount to
more than 50% of sales (% of ﬁrms
surveyed)
24% 41% 44% 8% 9% 19% 12%
Five largest buyers amount to
less than 10% of sales (% of ﬁrms
surveyed)
46% 47% 16% 64% 41% 63% 62%
Firms indicating they are the price
leader
(% of ﬁrms surveyed)
28% 24% 33% 28% 41% 15% 24%
Median number of competitors 6.5 20 5 8 6 7 108
In aggregate, 60 per cent of the ‘average’ ﬁrm’s sales were generated by sales to businesses.
Wholesalers and retailers had the lowest portion of sales generated from businesses at 44 per cent.
The nature of transactions for these wholesalers and retailers is also such that they have some
amount of their sales under contract and a low level of buyer concentration—the ﬁve most
important buyers account for less than 10 per cent of total sales. Similarly, low levels of buyer
concentration are also apparent in other service industries. Goods-producing industries, on the
other hand, have much higher rates of buyer concentration. Twenty-eight per cent of ﬁrms
identiﬁed themselves as price leaders in their industry and the median number of competitors for
our sample of ﬁrms was 6.5 competitors per ﬁrm. These ﬁrm characteristics are discussed further
later in the paper. In particular, section 3.3 discusses their implications for price-setting behaviour
and section 4.2 and Appendix B illustrate their roles in ﬁrms’ recognition rates for individual
theories of price stickiness.
The second section of the questionnaire included questions designed to improve the
understanding of the price-setting process. To examine the degree of price ﬂexibility, companies
were asked questions on the frequency of price reviews and price changes. To better understand
the motivation behind a ﬁrm’s decision to alter prices, the survey probed the reasons why a
company would change prices. Given the strong export orientation of the Canadian economy,
movements in the Canadian-dollar exchange rate represent another potentially important
inﬂuence on prices. With the value of the Canadian dollar vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar declining
steadily and signiﬁcantly for many years prior to and during the design and planning stages of the
survey, a series of questions on the effects of the exchange rate depreciation on proﬁt margins and
price adjustment were incorporated into the second section.
The third section asked questions about the relevance of various theories or explanations for price
stickiness. The main part of this section asked companies to evaluate the importance of six
theories of price rigidity. These theories had been considered important in other price-survey
studies or in other empirical or theoretical research. Each theory was presented using a one-line
statement capturing its essential features in non-technical language. The respondent could grade
the relevance of each theory to price adjustments at their ﬁrm using a four-point scale: (i) not
applicable, (ii) yes, slightly important, (iii) yes, fairly important and (iv) yes, very important. If
the respondent recognized the theory as an explanation for slow price adjustment at their ﬁrm,
follow-up questions were asked on issues speciﬁc to that theory before moving on to the next
theory.9
This section also included a single question on the relevance of ﬁve other explanations for delayed
price adjustment, but this was not followed by any supplementary questions, given the smaller
role played by these explanations in the economic literature. At the end of the survey, ﬁrms were
asked whether their responses applied to a broad range of their other products or services, and this
was generally found to be the case.7
3. Firm-LevelPrice-Setting Behaviour:Results
3.1  Estimating price ﬂexibility in Canada
In order to generate estimates of price-setting frequencies,8 ﬁrms were asked: “In the last
12 months how many times have you actually adjusted prices?” The distribution of answers to this
question is surprisingly wide. The most commonly cited answer, held by 27 per cent of the
sample, was that prices are adjusted once a year and often at the same time every year. Another
8 per cent cited no price changes at all in the past year (see Figure 1). Taking these two results
together, prices for about one-third of the measured Canadian economy are quite sticky. For these
ﬁrms, the costs of changing prices are burdensome relative to the beneﬁt.
Figure 1: In the last 12 months how many times have you actually adjusted prices?
7. More than three-quarters of the ﬁrms surveyed indicated that the responses were applicable to other
products or services, or that the question was irrelevant because they offered only one product or
service.
8. It should be noted that the number of price adjustments alone does not indicate price rigidity.
Infrequent price adjustment at some ﬁrms may simply reﬂect stability in demand and cost conditions
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For 38 per cent of the sample, prices change 2 to 12 times per year. At the other end of the
distribution, 29 per cent reported adjusting prices more than 12 times in the past year. At the
extreme end, 6 per cent reported changing prices more than 365 times in the past year. This
suggests that the classical paradigm of continuously market-clearing auction markets (continuous
costless repricing) applies to only a very small portion of Canadian product markets. This high
price ﬂexibility is largely the result of many of these ﬁrms changing prices on a customer-by-
customer basis.
Our estimates show that one-half of ﬁrms in Canada change their prices at least once every three
months, which is equivalent to a price change of four or more times a year. This result suggests
that prices in Canada are reasonably ﬂexible, particularly when compared with the results of
similar studies conducted recently in other countries. Survey results on price ﬂexibility are,
however, consistent with the ﬁndings reported in Bils and Klenow (2002).
3.2  Changes in price ﬂexibility over time
The Canadian economy has undergone considerable change over the past decade and a half. In
addition to lower, more stable, and predictable inﬂation, which, on the surface, may have reduced
the need for frequent price changes, ﬁrms have faced a steady stream of technological innovation,
new trade arrangements, improvements in public sector ﬁnances, and other developments that
may have altered their price-setting behaviour. To better understand the impact of these
inﬂuences, ﬁrms were asked “To the best of your knowledge, has the frequency of price
adjustments changed in the past decade?” The evidence suggests that prices in Canada have
become more ﬂexible over the past decade. While slightly more than half of the sample had not
changed the frequency with which they adjust prices over the past decade, 45 per cent had
adjusted their price-setting frequency. Three-quarters of ﬁrms in this latter group now change
prices more often compared with a decade ago.
Firms with increased price ﬂexibility were queried about why they had adjusted their pricing
behaviour. Three factors were noted (in order of importance): increased competition, increased
use of information technology, and increased volatility of input costs.
As many ﬁrms explained, more competition means their price in the market is wrong or ‘offside’
more often, and the costs of being ‘offside’ increase dramatically as competition increases.
Information technology acts as a tool to facilitate price reviews and adjustments in that it
enhances the information ﬂow, thereby reducing costs and lags associated with the price-setting
process. The third factor, increased volatility in input costs, was related to raw material, foreign
exchange, and energy costs.11
3.3  Factors inﬂuencing ﬁrm-level price ﬂexibility
From once every few years to several times a day, ﬁrms that participated in our survey report an
astonishingly wide range of behaviour when queried about their price-adjustment frequencies.
How can something as basic to every ﬁrm’s operations—the price at which it sells its wares—vary
so much? Our analysis suggests that several ﬁrm characteristics and circumstances explain much
of the variation in behaviour. Several ﬁrm characteristics were found to be statistically signiﬁcant
factors inﬂuencing the ﬁrm-level price-setting behaviour (see Table 4).
To the extent that characteristics, such as sectoral and ﬁrm-size breakdown, are found to be
signiﬁcant, they highlight the importance of having a representative sample when drawing
conclusions about economy-wide behaviour. Beyond this, understanding the factors that drive
ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour educates future theoretical discussions. If nothing else, this type of
analysis allows us to test our prior knowledge about price-setting behaviour.
Results presented in section 3.1 suggest a median number of four price changes per year overall
for the portion of the Canadian economy in the survey. However, this estimate is sensitive to the
ﬁrm’s speciﬁc situation.
On a sectoral basis, for example, price changes are most infrequent in the community, business,
and personal services sector, where they are generally reviewed and set annually. Many of these
service ﬁrms described the annual price change as synchronized to the annual wage settlement
with staff.9 Firms in retail and wholesale trade are at the other end of the distribution, with a
median of seven price changes per year. Other sectors are clustered near the centre, with three to
ﬁve price changes per year. These results are similar to those found in Hall, Walsh, and Yates
(1997). They show that services have the least ﬂexible prices, and retail and construction the most
ﬂexible prices.
Variation can also be seen on the basis of a ﬁrm’s size (as measured by the number of employees).
Large ﬁrms change prices about twice as often as medium ﬁrms, and ﬁve times more frequently
than small ﬁrms. Buckle and Carlson (2000) also ﬁnd that small ﬁrms change prices less
frequently. Many respondents explained that senior staff at small ﬁrms have numerous tasks in
addition to reviewing and adjusting prices. The administrative and management costs associated
with the price-setting process are therefore particularly onerous for small ﬁrms.
9. These ﬁrms conform to standard staggered contract models such as those proposed by Taylor (1979,
1980).12
A ﬁrm’s market circumstances play a role in determining its price-setting behaviour. For example,
ﬁrms with fewer competitors tend to be better able to resist more frequent price changes. As
previously mentioned, ﬁrms themselves reported increased competition as a major source of
increased price ﬂexibility.
Firms with a signiﬁcant export sales base10 have a higher number of median price changes. This
suggests that exposure to international customers will tend to make ﬁrm-level pricing more
ﬂexible. Firms focused on sales in their home region have fewer price changes. This may help to
explain why the Canadian economy, an economy very much open to trade, has ﬂexible prices.
Firms generally review prices in one of two ways: time-dependent, using a ﬁxed frequency
(e.g., quarterly, weekly, annually), or state-dependent, when they perceive a change in the ‘state’
of the market. The majority (about two-thirds) of ﬁrms surveyed exhibit time-dependent price-
reviewing behaviour. This ﬁgure conforms well to previous estimates: results presented in Blinder
et al. (1998) suggest 60 per cent for the U.S. economy; Hall, Walsh, and Yates (1997) suggest
79 per cent for the U.K. economy; and Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten (2001) suggest 59 per cent for
Sweden.
10. Firms were asked to respond to the question in the currency of their main business activity. This
implies thatdaily exchange rate ﬂuctuationswerenot considereda source ofprice ﬂexibility.13
Firms with time-dependent price reviews have far stickier prices than do state-dependent price
reviewers. This supports the view that ﬁrms with costly adjustments set prices with a ﬁxed
frequency to minimize these largely lump-sum costs—this creates rigidities. Many ﬁrms reporting
state-dependent price reviews price discriminate between customers. For them, the beneﬁts of
frequent price changes outweigh the costs.
Table 4: Characteristics that Inﬂuence Variations in the Frequency of
a Firm’s Price Adjustment
Factors leading to variations
in price-adjustment frequencies a
a. A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test of the equality of populations was conducted. For more information about the
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, see Kvanli, Guynes, and Pavur (1992).
* indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 99 per cent conﬁdence levels. ** indicates 90 per cent








% of ﬁrms reporting:






Total sample 170 4 34 18
Sectors (using NAICS codes) **
      Construction 18 5 22 6
      Manufacturing 44 4 36 16
      Retail and wholesale trade 25 7 4 28
      Information, cultural industries, & transportation 22 3 45 27
      Finance, insurance, & real estate 27 4 30 15
      Community, business and personal services 34 1 50 15
Firm size (using no. of employees) *
      Small (less than 101) 54 2 39 9
      Medium (101 to 499) 48 4 42 15
      Large (more than 499) 68 10 25 26
Geographic distribution of sales ***
      Export sales less than 50% of total sales 137 3 36 16
      Export sales at or more than 50% of total sales 33 9 27 24
Number of competitors ***
      0 to 5 68 2 49 16
      6 to 10 48 5 23 19
      11 to 24 23 4 26 26
      25+ 31 4 26 13
Price review type *
      State-dependent 57 10 12 30
      Time-dependent 113 2 44 1214
3.4  Factors that lead ﬁrms to adjust prices
Firms were queried about the types of shocks that most often led to price adjustments—that
motivate a ﬁrm to adjust prices. Firms were asked to think about the importance of ten types of
demand and supply shocks as factors leading to price adjustments. A similar exercise was
undertaken by Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten (2001) in their survey of Swedish ﬁrms. Table 5
illustrates that competitive forces dwarfed other factors—price changes by competitors stood out
as the most important factor leading to a price adjustment. Changes in non-labour domestic input
costs and changes in demand for the product/service also ranked well and were statistically
indistinguishable. These rankings match results in Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten (2001) almost
perfectly.
Table 5:  Rankings and Mean Score of Reasons for Price Adjustments
(1)
Triggers / Causes a
a. Firms were also asked about directives from parent companies. The response scored last in all industries and was












b. The mean score in column 2 is the weighted average of the ﬁrms’ responses to the importance of each trigger, where 4 is
“very important” and 1 is “not important.” The numbers in columns 3 to 8 are rankings of the importance of each trigger for a
given industry. The asterisk indicates that a given mean score in column 2 is statistically different at the 5 per cent level of
signiﬁcance from the mean score below it.
c. Information and cultural industries, and transportation and warehousing
d. Finance, insurance, and real estate
e. Business and personal services, food and accommodation services
Rankings based on mean score
Price changes by competitors 3.16* 1 4 1 1 2 1 1
Change in domestic inputs costs
(non-labour) 2.90 2 1 2 2 5 3 5
Change in demand for product/
service 2.89* 3 2 3 3 1 2 3
Change in wage costs 2.53* 4 3 5 7 3 6 2
We routinely change prices 2.18 5 7 7 4 4 8 4
Change in taxes, fees, and other
charges 2.09 6 6 6 8 8 5 6
Change in economic/inﬂation
forecast 2.01 7 5 9 9 6 4 7
Change in exchange rates 1.87 8 9 4 5 9 9 8
Sales campaigns 1.84 9 8 8 6 7 7 915
Where results do diverge from Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten (2001) concerns the importance of
wage costs. Our study ranks wage costs relatively high, fourth of ten factors, whereas the study of
Swedish ﬁrms ranks it much lower. Factors ranked ﬁfth to ninth are clustered together.
Differences between all ﬁve are statistically insigniﬁcant. Price-setting inﬂuences from parent
companies scored poorly as a price-adjustment motivator. This is a comforting result, since the
survey was explicitly designed to exclude ﬁrms that do not control the price-setting function for
their main product or service.
As expected, some factors are more or less compelling in different industries. Price changes by
competitors consistently ranked highest in all but two sectors. One of those, construction,11
ranked domestic input costs highest. Overall, input costs ranked high in goods-producing
industries and lower in services. Changes in demand for the product or service ranked well in
services and construction. Wages were most important in community, business, and personal
services. Economic and inﬂation forecasts were generally less relevant to most industries, with the
noted exceptions of the ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate sector, and construction. Exchange rates
were ranked eighth overall and were most relevant to manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.
Table 6 illustrates the extent to which these ‘factors’ that motivate ﬁrms to adjust prices are related
to the degree of ﬂexibility in prices. For example, ﬁrms that identiﬁed ‘we routinely change
prices’ (time-dependent price setters) and ‘wage costs’ as very important factors leading to price
changes had stickier prices. The basic message is that ﬁrms that place some importance on having
routine-price adjustment frequencies, and that said that wage costs are important, set prices less
often. Contrastingly, ﬁrms for which ‘price changes by competitors’ and ‘changes in exchange
rates’ were very important triggers had signiﬁcantly more ﬂexibility in prices.
11. Recallthe high variablecoststructure ofthe constructionsector inTable3.16
Table 6: Frequency of Price Adjustments, Inﬂuence of Motivators






Total sample 170 4
Sample excluding ﬁrms citing ‘event’-speciﬁc price
changes 134 2
Sample including only time-dependent pricing 113 2
Price-adjustment motivators (factors that lead to price changes)
We routinely change prices (very important factor) 43 2
We routinely change prices (otherwise) 127 4
Changes in wage costs (very important factor) 46 2
Changes in wage costs (otherwise) 124 4
Changes in other domestic input costs (very important
factor) 75 4
Changes in other domestic input costs (otherwise) 95 3
Changes in taxes, fees, and other charges (very important
factor) 20 3.5
Changes in taxes, fees, and other charges (otherwise) 150 4
Price changes by a competitor (very important factor) 83 6
Price changes by a competitor (otherwise) 87 2
Changes in exchange rates (very important factor) 29 7
Changes in exchange rates (otherwise) 141 3
Changes in demand for product/service (very important
factor) 59 4
Changes in demand for product/service (otherwise) 111 3
Changes in economic/inﬂation forecasts (very important
factor) 10 4
Changes in economic/inﬂation forecasts (otherwise) 160 4
Sales campaigns (very important factor) 19 12
Sales campaigns (otherwise) 151 3
Directives from parent company (very important factor) 5 1
Directives from parent company (otherwise) 165 417
3.5 Exchange rates and prices
From the mid-1990s to 2002, the Canadian dollar depreciated by about 30 per cent vis-à-vis the
U.S. dollar.12 Economic principles and models based upon historical relationships predict that a
depreciation of this magnitude and the resulting rise in the cost of imported goods would have had
a signiﬁcant impact on consumer prices. The fact that it did not puzzled many researchers. In light
of this development, ﬁrms participating in the price-setting survey were asked about the
relationship between the exchange rate and their output prices over this period. This section
highlights some key results.
Ninety-seven ﬁrms, representing 57 per cent of the sample, exported or imported intermediate or
ﬁnal goods (Table 7, Question B10). The ﬁrms most exposed to tradable goods were
manufacturers (89 per cent) and ﬁrms operating in wholesale and retail trade (76 per cent). The
ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate sector had the lowest share of such ﬁrms (11 per cent).13
Of these 97 ﬁrms with exposure to tradable goods, about 44 per cent indicated that they were
negatively affected by the depreciating currency, 39 per cent were positively affected, and 17 per
cent indicated no substantive effect on operations. Not surprisingly, manufacturers, having the
largest percentage of export sales (45 per cent on average), were the most likely to acknowledge
some beneﬁt from the depreciation. Firms most adversely affected by the depreciation of the
Canadian dollar were net importers involved in construction, wholesale and retail trade,
transportation, and communications. Many of the follow-up questions focused on this group.
In order to better understand the limited pass-through of the exchange rate into prices, ﬁrms
adversely affected by the depreciation of the Canadian dollar were asked how they mitigated the
effect of higher import costs on their proﬁt margins (Table 7, Question B13). Increasing selling
prices was the most important way of restoring margins for 47 per cent of affected ﬁrms.14
Another 23 per cent of ﬁrms cited shifting to non-U.S. sources of supply as their primary means
of offsetting the effects of rising import costs. For the remaining ﬁrms, the top-rated means of
adjustment were either increasing productivity or volumes of activity (14 per cent) or reducing




to the appreciation of the Canadian dollar. Results from both surveys are consistent: exposure to the
exchangerateishighestinexport-intensivesectors(naturalresourcesandmanufacturing)andimport-
intensivesectors (wholesaleandretail trade).For moreinformation,see BankofCanada (2005).
14. Beyond the 47 per cent of ﬁrms citing increased selling prices as the most important measure taken to
restore margins, an additional 30 per cent cited increased selling prices as a secondary or tertiary
measure.Intotal, 76 per cent ofﬁrmsreported increasing sellingprices.18
Table 7: Key Questions & Results, Exchange Rates and Prices
Question  Survey questions and key results
B10 Do you import/export intermediate inputs or ﬁnished goods? [n=170, entire sample]
yes (57%)    no (43%)
B11 Which statement best exempliﬁes the immediate impact of an exchange rate depreciation on your ﬁrm’s
margin. [n=97, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to B10]
Signiﬁcant negative effect (16%)    Moderate negative effect (28%)    No signiﬁcant effect (16%)
Moderate positive effect (21%)    Signiﬁcant positive effect (19%)
B12 Have higher U.S.-dollar margins diverted sales from Canadian to foreign markets? [n=52, ﬁrms replying
‘no signiﬁcant effect’/’positive effect’ to B11]
yes (23%)    no (77%)
* note that two ﬁrms who chose no signiﬁcant effect in B11 did not answer this question.
B13 Faced with a smaller margin because of a depreciating dollar, rank the following in order of their impor-
tance as a means of restoring margins in recent years (Rank the top 3, 1=most important, 2=second most
important, 3=third most important). [n=43, ﬁrms replying ‘negative effect’ to B11]
Increase selling prices: ranked 1 (20) ranked 2 (9) ranked 3 (4)
Shift input to non-U.S. supplier: ranked 1 (10) ranked 2 (10) ranked 3 (4)
reduce other input costs: ranked 1 (5) ranked 2 (13) ranked 3 (4)
increase productivity or volumes of activity: ranked 1 (7) ranked 2 (7) ranked 3 (8)
reduce other costs: ranked 1 (2) ranked 2 (7) ranked 3 (8)
other means of restoring margin: ranked 1 (1) ranked 2 (2) ranked 3 (3)
B14 On average, how much of your proﬁt margin have you recouped in the 12 months following a
depreciation? [n=43, ﬁrms replying ‘negative effect’ to B11]
virtually none (26%)    less than half (14%)    about half (14%)    more than half (9%)
 virtually all (14%)    don’t know (23%)
B15 How much does the exchange rate depreciate before you would adjust prices? [n=43, ﬁrms replying
‘negative effect’ to B11]
<5% (16%)    5% to 10% (33%)    10% to 20% (12%)    20% to 30% (9%)    >30% (5%)
not applicable/don’t know (26%)
B16 Are foreign exchange costs more difﬁcult to pass on to consumers now than a decade ago? [n=43, ﬁrms
replying ‘negative effect’ to B11]
yes (60%)    no (40%)
If yes, why? (note that ﬁrms could choose more than one answer) [n=26, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to B16]
Competition from domestic sources (38%)    Competition from foreign sources (17%)
fewer buyers exert more power on our ﬁrm to keep prices down (2%)
low inﬂation makes price increases more visible and more difﬁcult to justify (10%)    other factors (33%)
B17 During signiﬁcant exchange rate depreciation, do suppliers reduce their price to offset part of the higher
import costs? [n=95, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to B10]
No, no offset (72%)    Yes, infrequently (13%)     Yes, often (11%)    Yes, but I don’t know how often (5%)
* note that two ﬁrms who chose ‘yes’ in B10 did not answer this question.
Note: This table summarizes key questions and corresponding results for the section on exchange rates and prices. Questions
and results are presented in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire. A copy of the full questionnaire is
provided in Appendix A.19
macroeconomic evidence of limited pass-through into prices. While raising selling prices was the
key response reported by ﬁrms facing weaker margins, it seems this and other measures were only
partially successful at restoring margins. Results from the survey help unravel this puzzle (Table
7, Question B14). Twelve months following a reduction in proﬁt margins owing to a depreciation,
about 70 per cent of ﬁrms indicated they recouped only about half or less of their initial proﬁt
margin.15 Complete or near complete margin recovery was reported by only 18 per cent of ﬁrms.
Only 22 per cent of ﬁrms considered an exchange rate depreciation of less than 5 per cent as a
motivation for adjusting prices upwards.16 Another 44 per cent of ﬁrms indicated that the
depreciation would have to be at least 5 to 10 per cent for them to initiate a price change. The
remaining one-third of ﬁrms indicated threshold levels above 10 per cent. Survey responses
suggest that it would not be until the depreciation was as large as 10 per cent that as many as two-
thirds of ﬁrms would begin adjusting their selling prices in response to the depreciation.17
Finally, the survey explored whether ﬁrms believed passing through higher import costs had
become more difﬁcult over the past decade. More than 60 per cent of the ﬁrms negatively affected
by the depreciation acknowledged more difﬁculties in shifting higher import costs to customers.
Nearly two-thirds of these ﬁrms attributed the difﬁculty to either competition from domestic
sources, competition from foreign sources, or both. A signiﬁcant portion cited ‘other’ reasons.
Among these, increased price sensitivity by customers was the key factor reported. Inertia in
prices, and the factors that lead ﬁrms to delay price changes, are the topics of the next section of
this paper.
4. Evaluating Theoriesof PriceStickiness: Results
4.1  Summary of theories
In addition to gaining a better understanding of price-setting behaviour, our survey also assessed
ten theories of price inertia. These theories were proposed to ﬁrms as a series of short plain-
language statements and are contained in Table 8 along with the percentage of ﬁrms that
recognized the theory as a source of price rigidity.
15. The percentage calculation excludes 10 of the 43 ﬁrms facing negative effects from exchange rate
depreciationwhocited that they didnot knowhow muchoftheirproﬁt margin wasrecouped.
16. Eleven ﬁrmsdid not answerthis question andso areexcludedfrom thepercentagecalculation.
17. Unfortunately, the question was not asked in terms of in what time frame the speciﬁed amount of
depreciationwould have tooccurbefore aprice response wasinitiated.20
Each theory attributes sticky-price behaviour to speciﬁc causes. For example, sticky information
describes ﬁrms as making the best decision with the available information at the time. However,
that information is subject to lags and available infrequently. Other theories give institutional
arrangements such as contracts, both those that are written and unwritten, an important role in
creating price rigidities. These agreements between parties, whether they be explicit or implicit,
often ﬁx prices as a means of protecting one or both parties, but also reduce the opportunities to
adjust prices. Cost-based pricing suggests that prices of ﬁnal goods adjust to costs with a lag.
This lag depends upon how quickly individual ﬁrms revise prices in response to changes in costs,
and on the length of the multi-stage production process for a ﬁnal good. Given the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
focus of the survey, questions on costs centred on the ﬁrm-level responses to costs, not the chain-
of-production process among ﬁrms. Coordination failure attributes price stickiness to the fact
that ﬁrms would rather hold back on a price change and wait for other ﬁrms to go ﬁrst. If all ﬁrms
behave this way, a price change may not go ahead for some time.
Menu and customer-relations costs suggest there are ﬁxed costs associated with adjusting prices
and that these costs force ﬁrms to reduce the number of adjustments they undertake. Non-price
competition proposes that ﬁrms sometimes change the characteristics of their product or service
instead of changing prices. It may also be that low inﬂation makes it difﬁcult for ﬁrms to adjust
prices because price changes are immediately viewed as real price changes as opposed to nominal
price changes. Finally, we included a category based on results from pre-testing which suggests
that factors inﬂuencing prices do not change often enough to warrant changing prices more
often. The remainder of this section discusses key ﬁndings related to each theory.
The results indicate that cost-based pricing, customer relations, non-price competition, and
explicit contracts were the theories most recognized by respondents. Sticky information and menu
costs were the least recognized (Table 8). It should also be noted that theory recognition by ﬁrms
is not mutually exclusive. For example, ﬁrms might indicate that they hold back on a price
increase (i.e., coordination failure) because they fear antagonizing customers (i.e., customer
relations).21
4.2  Detailed results by theory18
4.2.1 Cost-based pricing
The idea that prices are largely a function of input costs is, perhaps, one of the simplest theories of
price determination. In and of itself, however, this hardly qualiﬁes as a theory of price stickiness,
since the lags between cost shocks and price hikes are possibly very short. However, Gordon
(1981) and Blanchard (1983) show that even short lags, once multiplied by the sometimes
Table 8: Percentage of Firms that Recognized Each Theory as a Reason for
Infrequent Price Changes




Prices depend mainly on the costs of labour and raw materials used in
producing goods and services. Therefore, prices don’t change until costs
change.
67.1
Customer relations Prices could not change more often without disturbing customer rela-
tions. 55.3
Explicit contracts
Firms would like to adjust prices more often to reﬂect market conditions,
but ﬁxed-price contracts make it difﬁcult to pass on price increases when




Firms are more likely to amend product characteristics (e.g., warranty,
delivery lag) than prices. 44.1
Coordination failure
- rising prices
Firms delay price increases because they do not want to be the ﬁrst in the
industry to raise prices. 41.2
Low inﬂation Low inﬂation makes large price changes more noticeable. 33.5
Implicit contracts Firms delay price increases because they have an implied understanding
with customers that they will not raise prices in tight markets. 31.8
Coordination failure
- falling prices
Firms delay price cuts because they do not want to be the ﬁrst in the
industry to cut prices. 31.2
Factor stability Factors inﬂuencing prices do not change often enough to warrant
changes. 31.2
Menu costs It would be too costly to change prices more often (time, effort, out-of-
pocket costs). 21.2
Sticky information
The information used to review (and ultimately change) prices is availa-
ble infrequently. Therefore, prices may be slow to adjust to new condi-
tions.
13.5
18. Where follow-up questions related to speciﬁc theories were asked, this section provides a short
summary table and discusses results. This section also draws on data presented in Appendix B, which
reviewshowﬁrmcharacteristics are relatedtothe selectionofa particulartheoryof price stickiness.22
numerous steps in the chain of production, can lead to considerable inertia at the aggregate price
level. To the extent that ﬁrms wait until actual costs change to increase prices (i.e., ﬁrms do not
raise prices in anticipation of a cost increase), this theory provides a simple and compelling
argument for price stickiness.
Among the ten theories tested, cost-based pricing is the most widely recognized theory proposed
to our sample of Canadian ﬁrms—two of every three ﬁrms recognized this concept (Table 9,
Question C8). Of these ﬁrms, about half believed it was a “very important” factor. Blinder et al.
(1998) also ﬁnd a strong acceptance for cost-based pricing—the concept ranks second overall on
acceptance (percentage of ﬁrms recognizing the theory) and on mean score (importance as a
source of price rigidity).
To better gauge ﬁrms’ behaviour when faced with a cost shock, ﬁrms responding positively to the
cost-based pricing theory were asked how they react when they foresee a future cost increase
(Table 9, Question C10). About 40 per cent of ﬁrms said they do indeed raise prices in
Table 9: Key Questions & Results, Cost-Based Pricing
Question  Survey questions and key results
A7 Approximately what percentage of main product costs are variable. [n=170, entire sample]
0 to 20% (11%)    21 to 40% (11%)    41 to 60% (20%)    61 to 80% (33%)    81% to 100% (25%)
C8 “Prices depend mainly on the costs of labour and raw materials used in producing goods and
services. Therefore, prices don’t change until costs change.” Does the statement apply to your
ﬁrm? [n=170, entire sample]
No (33%) Yes, slightly important (14%) Yes, fairly important (19%) Yes, very important (34%)
C9 Are temporary cost increases more difﬁcult to pass into prices than increases viewed as perma-
nent? [n=114, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to C8]
yes (63%)    no (37%)
C10 If you foresee an increase in your future costs (such as raw materials), do you (Choose any of the
following): [n=114, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to C8]
buy in advance and store (38%)    hedge against cost increases (27%)
raise own prices in anticipation (40%)    take no action (33%)
C11 If you take no action, why? (Choose all applicable) [n=37, ﬁrms replying ‘take no action’ to C10]
it would antagonize our customers (32%)    we are not conﬁdent in our forecasts or estimates (3%)
we are reluctant to take the lead in raising prices (11%)
we can easily raise prices when actually required (54%)
Note: This table summarizes key questions and corresponding results for a speciﬁc theory. Questions and results
are presented in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire. A copy of the full questionnaire is
provided in Appendix A.23
anticipation of higher future costs. The remainder do not raise prices in anticipation of a cost
shock and may introduce a lag between costs and price changes. Thirty-three per cent take no
action whatsoever, 38 per cent report buying in advance and storing inventory, and 27 per cent
report hedging against cost increases. These latter two measures are more typical in goods-
producing sectors, such as construction and manufacturing, which can more effectively hedge or
store their inputs. Recognition of the cost-based pricing theory itself is generally insensitive to
industry differences.19
Several other ﬁrm characteristics and circumstances are associated with cost-based pricing
behaviour. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms with fewer competitors and fewer buyers have signiﬁcantly higher
acceptance rates for cost-based pricing than ﬁrms with many competitors and many buyers
(see Tables B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B).20 This ﬁnding may reﬂect specialized markets that are
approaching natural monopolies. Since both parties (buyers and sellers) need each other, cost-
based pricing is the best way to set prices fairly. This is further supported by the ﬁnding that ﬁrms
selling to business, government, and institutional buyers have signiﬁcantly higher acceptance
rates for cost-based pricing than those ﬁrms selling predominantly to households (Table B.4).
Firms with a high variable cost structure also have signiﬁcantly higher acceptance rates than ﬁrms
with a ﬁxed cost structure (see Table B.5). This is not surprising, since ﬁrms with a higher
proportion of variable costs are more exposed to cost shocks and therefore need to move prices in
response.
4.2.2 Explicit contracts
Explicit contracts ﬁx nominal prices over a speciﬁed period of time and have long been
recognized as a source of price stickiness. Within Keynesian macroeconomic models, nominal
contracts, especially for wages, have been assigned a central role in explaining the inﬂuence of
monetary policy on real economic activity.21 About 75 per cent of ﬁrms surveyed utilized some
type of contract for a certain percentage of their sales. As in Blinder et al.’s (1998) study, the
distribution of contract use is bimodal, with peaks at the upper and lower ends (see Table 10,
Question A10).




a large portion of sales also accept cost-based pricing more often than ﬁrms where buyers are
atomistic.
21. For further discussion on the role of nominal ﬁxed-wage and ﬁxed-price contracts in inﬂuencing how
monetary policy affects real economic variables, see Fischer(1977) andPhelps andTaylor(1977).24
Despite the prevalence of contract use, only 45 per cent of ﬁrms (Table 10, Question C12)
recognized explicit contracts as inhibiting price increases.22 In other words, more than one-third
of ﬁrms with contract sales indicated that their prices are not constrained by contracts. For many
of these ﬁrms, contracts either did not include binding price arrangements or included price
escalation or de-escalation clauses, which allow prices to respond to changes in demand or costs.
22. ThecomparablerecognitionrateforBlinderetal.(1998)is50.5percent.Blinderetal.actuallyreport
37 per cent in their “ranking of theories” table (Table 5.2, p. 110), because they exclude those ﬁrms
attaching onlyminor importance to explicitcontracts as asource ofprice stickiness.
Table 10: Key Questions & Results, Explicit Contracts
Question  Survey questions and key results
A10 Sales distribution (percentage of sales under contract) [n=170, entire sample]
no contract sales (25.3%)    1 to 24% (18.2%)    25 to 49% (4.7%)
50 to 74% (4.7%)    75 to 99% (11.2%)    100% (35.9%)
A11 To the best of your knowledge, have the contract vs. non-contract proportions changed signiﬁ-
cantly compared with a decade ago? If so, which has gained importance in sales over the dec-
ade? [n=170, entire sample]
no, roughly the same (81%)    yes, contract sales have gained (14%)
yes, non-contract sales have gained (5%)
C12 “Firms would like to adjust prices more often to reﬂect market conditions, but ﬁxed-price con-
tracts make it difﬁcult to pass on price increases when a contract is active” Does the statement
apply to your ﬁrm? [n=170, entire sample]
No (55%)    Yes, slightly important (10%)    Yes, fairly important (7%)    Yes, very important (28%)
C13 Do contracts prevent prices from decreasing when demand or costs fall? [n=77, ﬁrms replying
‘yes’ to C12]
yes (71%)    no (29%)
C14 Do you offer discounts on posted prices? [n=77, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to C12]
yes (45%)    no (55%)
C15 What is the average period of time over which prices are ﬁxed in contracts (in months)? [n=77,
ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to C12]
0 to 11 months (18%)    12 months (44%)    13 to 24 months (16%)
25 to 60 months (17%)    more than 60 months (5%)
C16 Is this period generally longer, shorter, or the same, compared to 10 years ago? [n=77, ﬁrms
replying ‘yes’ to C12]
longer (23%)    shorter (19%)    same (58%)
Note: This table summarizes key questions and corresponding results for a speciﬁc theory. Questions and results are presented
in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire. A copy of the full questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.25
How widespread are explicit contracts? Slightly more than one-half of ﬁrms who use nominal
contracts do so for only a portion of their sales (Table 10, Question A10). Therefore, a more
accurate estimate of the potential impact of explicit contracts on prices would be to weight
average contract lengths by the estimated portion of sales covered by written contracts. Using this
approach, estimates suggest that prices for about 38 per cent of the sample may be inﬂexible for
some period of time owing to explicit contracts.
How long are prices ﬁxed under explicit contracts? The most frequently cited contract length is
12 months (Table 10, Question C15), but due to the existence of long-lived contracts in the
ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate sector, the average contract length is 22 months. Contract
lengths are generally unchanged over the past 10 years despite low rates of inﬂation over this
period (Table 10, Question C16).
Question C13 in Table 10 offered an opportunity to test whether the effects of explicit contracts
on price stickiness were symmetric; that is, whether contracts can keep prices ﬁxed as effectively
when demand or cost pressures are subsiding as when demand and cost pressures are intensifying.
According to some economists,23 the effect of explicit contracts on price stickiness is
asymmetrical, because falling prices would prompt customers locked into older contracts at
higher prices to demand equitable treatment with newer customers. The survey shows that about
29 per cent of the ﬁrms that recognized explicit contracts as preventing prices from rising also
indicated that contracts do not prevent prices from falling when demand or cost pressures subside.
This percentage is virtually identical to that reported by Blinder et al. (1998) for the United
States.24 This result suggests that explicit contracts introduce somewhat more price inertia when
demand or cost pressures are intensifying than when they are subsiding.
4.2.3 Implicit contracts
Beyond explicit written contracts, ﬁrms may conduct business on the basis of an “invisible
handshake,” as Okun (1981) suggests—these ‘implied’ contracts force ﬁrms to stabilize prices.
This commitment to not raise prices in strong markets was recognized by 32 per cent of ﬁrms
surveyed (Table 11, Question C17). Overall, therefore, this theory ranked seventh. It received a
similar rank in both the U.S. and U.K. studies, suggesting it holds promise as a theory of price
stickiness, but faces some limitations.
23. Blinder et al. (1998, 143), suggest that Stigler and Kindahl (1970) were inﬂuential in fostering
acceptance ofasymmetrical effects.
24. In Blinder et al. (1998), 28 per cent of ﬁrms accepting the explicit contract theory indicated that
contracts arealess important source of price stickinessduring periodsoffallingdemand andcosts.26
On the issue of asymmetries, our ﬁndings suggest, as with explicit contracts, that prices are more
sticky upwards than they are downwards. Of the 55 ﬁrms indicating that this type of commitment
exists in strong markets, over half also noted that the commitment is not reciprocated by
customers—they demand price concessions in weak markets. Interestingly, the recognition of
implicit contracts is not sensitive to ﬁrm size, industry grouping, and other ﬁrm characteristics.
4.2.4 Coordination failure
Prices may be unresponsive to a change in demand or inputs costs because individual ﬁrms prefer
to wait until competing ﬁrms have changed prices before changing their own. If ﬁrms do indeed
behave this way and no effective means of ‘coordinating’ a price change is imposed, a
considerable lag may exist between shocks and their resulting price response. While the concept
has a long history, the model proposed by Ball and Romer (1991) best exempliﬁes this type of
behaviour.
For this theory in particular, the idea that behaviour may differ between a price hike and price cut
was tested explicitly by creating two questions, one in terms of a price hike and the other a price
cut. Coordination failure was accepted by 41 per cent of ﬁrms when prices were increasing, but
only 31 per cent recognized this as an explanation for price rigidity when prices declined
(Table 12, Questions C4 and C6). This asymmetry in coordination failure is also found by Blinder
et al. (1998, 310) who draw the following implication for monetary policy: “increases in the
nominal money supply should [therefore] be more effective at ending recessions than decreases
are at causing them.”
Table 11: Key Questions & Results, Implicit Contracts
Question  Survey questions and key results
C17 “Firms delay price increases because they have an implied understanding with customers that
they will not raise prices in tight markets.” Does the statement apply to your ﬁrm? [n=170, entire
sample]
No (68%)    Yes, slightly important (10%)    Yes, fairly important (14%)    Yes, very important (8%)
C18 Does the opposite hold true in weak markets (customers less likely to demand price conces-
sions)? [n=55, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to C17]
yes (35%)    no (65%)
Note: This table summarizes key questions and corresponding results for a speciﬁc theory. Questions and
results are presented in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire. A copy of the full
questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.27
On both questions (a price increase or decrease), ﬁrms were questioned about why they waited for
a competing ﬁrm to change prices ﬁrst. The 71 ﬁrms that accepted coordination failure when
prices are rising focused on two reasons for waiting to raise prices (Table 12, Question C7).
Nearly half (48 per cent) cited concerns that they would lose too many customers and/or too much
market share. Twenty-seven per cent said that their customers were less upset at a price hike if a
competitor raised prices ﬁrst. In both cases, negative outcomes with customers were a motivating
concern for not raising prices. Of the 53 ﬁrms recognizing coordination failure on a price decline,
most focused on two reasons for waiting to cut prices: ﬁrms worried about a price cut reducing
margins or triggering a price war (Table 12, Question C5).
Table 12: Key Questions & Results, Coordination Failure
Question Survey questions and key results
A16 Is there a price leader in your industry? [n=170, entire sample]
yes (51%)    no (49%)
A17 If so, is your ﬁrm considered the price leader? [n=86, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to A16]
yes (55%)    no (45%)
C4 “Firms delay price cuts because they don’t want to be the ﬁrst in the industry to cut prices.”
Does the statement apply to your ﬁrm? [n=170, entire sample]
No (69%)    Yes, slightly important (7%)    Yes, fairly important (13%)    Yes, very important (11%)
C5 Why does the statement apply to your ﬁrm? (Choose all applicable) [n=53, ﬁrms replying
‘yes’ to C4]
price cuts may trigger a price war (31%)    lower prices hurt our margins (44%)
if we cut prices ﬁrst, new business would exceed our capacity (3%)
we worry that the need for a price cut may be temporary (12%)    other (11%)
C6 “Firms delay raising prices because they don’t want to be the ﬁrst in the industry to cut prices.”
Does the statement apply to your ﬁrm? [n=170, entire sample]
No (59%)    Yes, slightly important (15%)    Yes, fairly important (15%)    Yes, very important (11%)
C7 Why does the statement apply to your ﬁrm? (Choose all applicable) [n=71, ﬁrms replying
‘yes’ to C6]
cannot sell anything above our competitors’ prices (14%)
we would lose too many customers/market share (48%)
if a competitor raises prices ﬁrst, customers are less upset (27%)    other (12%)
Note: This table summarizes key questions and corresponding results for a speciﬁc theory. Questions and
results are presented in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire. A copy of the full
questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.28
A key assumption underpinning coordination failure as a viable theory of price stickiness is that
all ﬁrms behave in a similar fashion. A single ﬁrm showing price leadership could effectively
eliminate coordination failure as a source of price stickiness. Firms were therefore asked if there
exists a ﬁrm in their industry that ﬁts the description of a price leader—a ﬁrm that is unconcerned
about moving prices when required and therefore leads others to quickly change prices (Table 12,
Questions A16 and A17).
The sample was almost exactly split into two groups: those recognizing a price leader in their
industry and those without price leaders. Those ﬁrms citing some type of price leadership in their
industry were asked if they themselves were considered the price leader in their respective
industries. Of that group, about half (i.e., a quarter of the entire sample) indicated that they were
the price leader in their industry.
Still, results show that even price leaders have an asymmetrical reaction to coordination failure.
Firms describing themselves as price leaders show little reluctance to initiate a price decrease.
However, on a price increase, these same ﬁrms are just as worried as other ﬁrms about the
negative consequences.25 These results suggest that price leadership may be an effective means of
breaking through coordination failure on a price cut, but that it is not as effective on a price hike.
4.2.5 Non-price competition
The idea that markets might clear by means other than price is perhaps best described by Carlton
(1989). Firms, for example, may choose to respond to changes in market conditions by altering
the features of the product or service (e.g., volume per unit, quality of inputs, client service levels,
credit requirements, the seniority of staff assigned to projects, and/or delivery times), rather than
its price.
In Canada, about 44 per cent of ﬁrms recognized non-price competition as a source of price
rigidity—ranked third overall. A ﬁrm’s willingness to modify product and service features instead
of prices was not found to be statistically different across industries and ﬁrm sizes, nor was it
inﬂuenced by cost structure, degree of buyer concentration, and the number of competitors faced
by the ﬁrm.
25. Thirty-six per cent of ﬁrms describing themselves as the price leader in their industry recognize
coordination failure when prices are rising—a proportion which is similar to the total sample (41 per
cent). However, when prices are falling, only 19 per cent of price leaders recognize coordination
failure—a much smaller proportion than the total sample (31 per cent). This result is statistically
signiﬁcant atthe95 per centconﬁdence level.29
However, non-price competition did have signiﬁcantly higher acceptance among ﬁrms selling to
households (see Table B.4) and ﬁrms for which domestic markets are the predominant sales area
(see Table B.6). Furthermore, ﬁrms identifying themselves as time-dependent price reviewers
(i.e., ﬁrms that review and set prices with a ﬁxed periodicity) had a higher acceptance of this
theory that is weakly signiﬁcant (see Table B.7).
4.2.6 Customer relations
Previous subsections have outlined key ﬁndings related to several of the most widely recognized
theories of price stickiness. While these are useful explanations of how sticky prices manifest
themselves, they say little about why ﬁrms would choose these behaviours. For example, why do
ﬁrms not change prices until costs have changed (cost-based pricing)? Why do ﬁrms not raise
prices until other ﬁrms have done so (coordination failure)? Why do ﬁrms change the non-price
characteristics of their product or service rather than change the price (non-price competition)?
Why do ﬁrms stick to a nominal price contract when conditions dictate a price change is in order
(explicit contracts)?
As alluded to previously, these behaviours are often the result of a ﬁrm’s concern that price
changes may antagonize customers. Fifty-ﬁve per cent of ﬁrms surveyed agreed that ‘prices could
not change more often without disturbing customer relations’—the second most accepted theory
overall after cost-based pricing.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence on customer relations comes from Table 13, which shows
the entire sample of ﬁrms divided into four groups based on the frequency with which the ﬁrms
adjust prices. Beyond being widely recognized overall, customer relations costs have a very high
level of acknowledgement among ﬁrms with the stickiest prices. Seventy-six per cent of ﬁrms
who change their prices only once or not at all during the year recognize this factor as a source of
price rigidity (see Table 13).
Our survey is not the ﬁrst to point this out. While Blinder et al. (1998) did not directly ask ﬁrms
what impact a price change might have on customer relations, ﬁrms participating in the survey
volunteered this factor as a key motivator in several different circumstances. For example, in
response to an open-ended question, ‘Why don’t you change prices more frequently than you do?’
the most often-cited reason was that more frequent price adjustments would “antagonize” or
“cause difﬁculties for” customers. Overall, 121 of the 200 ﬁrms in his sample offered (without
being prompted) the view that customer relations costs were a key reason to keep price changes at
a minimum. The authors conclude that: “real world companies were practically standing up and
shouting that what they view as excessive price variability would ‘antagonize’ or ‘cause
difﬁculties for’ their customers” (Blinder et al. 1998, 308).30
Historically, customer relations costs have received very little attention as a theoretical source of
price stickiness.26 Recently, however, Rotemberg (2002, 2003) has modelled price rigidity on the
basis of consumers’ judgment about the altruism shown to them by suppliers. His work shows that
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost-based
pricing 67.1 69.0 74.4 62.8 60.0 0.7 0.565 None
Customer
relations 55.3 75.9 59.0 37.2 36.7 7.4** 0.000 1&3**,
1&4**
Non-price
competition 44.1 46.6 46.2 41.9 40.0 0.2 0.921 None




41.2 48.3 41.0 39.5 30.0 0.9 0.429 None
Low inﬂation 33.5 48.3 25.6 25.6 26.7 2.9** 0.034 1&2*, 1&3*




31.2 29.3 30.8 37.2 26.7 0.4 0.779 None
Factors do not
change 31.2 48.3 30.8 20.9 13.3 5.1** 0.002 1&3**,
1&4**
Menu costs 21.2 37.9 20.5 11.6 3.3 6.5** 0.000 1&3**,
1&4**, 2&4*
Sticky
information 13.5 17.2 15.4 11.6 6.7 0.7 0.550 None
26. As a result of its peripheral role in mainstream theoretical work, we did not ask probing questions on
the topic. We would certainly recommend that future surveys of a similar nature query business about
this source ofprice stickiness.31
‘fairness’ can be modelled to mimic much of the microeconomic evidence about price
adjustments, including: “the observation that prices are variable across customers and across
certain time intervals (namely when there are ‘specials’) while they are relatively stable in
response to other shocks” (Rotemberg 2003, 42).
Furthermore, other empirical evidence also supports the view that the customer relations costs of
price changes are a much more important source of price rigidities. Zbaracki et al. (2003) follow
closely the price-adjustment process at a large U.S. industrial manufacturer. Data generated from
this detailed analysis suggest managerial costs are more than 6 times, and customer costs more
than 20 times, larger than physical menu costs. Customer costs are split into two types: customer
communication costs and customer negotiation costs.
4.2.7 Menu costs
Firms were asked about the role that the physical menu costs of a price adjustment (time, effort,
and out-of-pocket costs such as reprinting and re-tagging) play in creating sticky prices. As
Wolman (2000) points out, the traditional menu costs theory is one of the best-developed theories
of sticky prices and the simplest—it gives ﬁrms some ability to set their own prices (some
monopoly power) and assumes that the costs of changing prices are mostly lump sum. While
Barro (1972) formalizes menu costs, the origins of this theory go back to the 1930s.
These traditional menu costs were recognized by only 21 per cent of respondents, and it is
therefore one of the least recognized theories. While few ﬁrms recognized these costs overall,
those with inﬂexible prices were much more likely to accept this theory. Thirty-eight per cent of
ﬁrms with fewer than two price changes per year found this to be a source of price rigidities (see
Table 13). Contrastingly, only 3 per cent of ﬁrms with more than 52 price changes per year
responded positively to this concept. In other words, ﬁrms with the stickiest prices are over ten
times more likely to identify menu costs as a source of price rigidity—for them, menu costs do
matter.
Physical menu costs scored equally poorly in previous surveys. Hall, Walsh, and Yates (1997)
report a 7 per cent recognition rate for this theory—the lowest in the survey of U.K. companies.
Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten (2001) report that Swedish ﬁrms ranked menu costs eleventh of
thirteen theories.27
27. Blinder et al.’s (1998) adjustment cost question included both physical menu costs and information-
gathering costs, and is therefore not readily comparable. Still, ‘costly price adjustments’ ranked sixth
oftwelvetheories.32
4.2.8 Factor stability
During the pre-testing stage of this survey, several ﬁrms mentioned that prices did not change
more often because most of the reasons for price adjustments did not occur very often (demand or
costs), and so prices did not need to change more often. Blinder et al. (1998) faced a similar
sample of ﬁrms that seemed isolated from the churning one might expect in markets.28 In order to
capture this group in our survey, all ﬁrms were asked to evaluate this statement: ‘factors
inﬂuencing prices do not change often enough to warrant changes in prices.’
Overall, this theory was the third least popular of the ten theories tested, but was still recognized
by 31 per cent of the sample. Like menu costs, however, this theory has much more traction
among ﬁrms with fewer than two changes per year; 48 per cent recognize it (see Table 13).
Table B.1 in Appendix B reveals that, among industries, manufacturers are the least likely to
recognize this theory, while ﬁrms in information and cultural industries are the most likely to
recognize this concept. Small ﬁrms (Table B.8), ﬁrms with a domestic sales base (Table B.6), and
ﬁrms with a ﬁxed cost structure (Table B.5) are also relatively more attracted to this idea.
4.2.9 Low inﬂation
A key beneﬁt often attributed to low, stable, and predictable inﬂation (and the inﬂation targets that
support this environment) is that it clariﬁes the signalling function of the price system. As the
argument goes, if economic agents have well-anchored expectations of inﬂation, they will
recognize any price increase above the target as being a real price change, as opposed to a nominal
price change, and react accordingly. Firms were therefore asked: does low inﬂation make large
price changes more noticeable? Strictly speaking, this is not a theory of price stickiness, since the
concept allows for some movement in prices downwards and, furthermore, allows for price
increases at the rate of inﬂation.
Overall, 34 per cent of ﬁrms surveyed accepted this as a reason why prices might be more rigid
than desired. Firms offered interesting anecdotes about customers’ sensitivity to price changes
above the rate of inﬂation. Several mentioned that they preferred to ‘stay off the radar screen’ or
‘did not want to rock the boat with key customers’ and so they held price increases to 2 or 3 per
cent per year.
28. Blinder et al. (1998, 85, Table 4.2). When asked: “Why don’t you change prices more frequently than
that?” 27 of196 ﬁrms surveyed saidtheircosts did not changemoreoften.33
As was the case for several previously mentioned theories, ﬁrms with fewer than two price
changes per year were signiﬁcantly more sensitive to the concept that price changes beyond the
rate of inﬂation would attract the attention of customers and therefore lead to unwanted outcomes.
Of this group, 48 per cent accepted this as a reason for price stickiness (see Table 13). Firms with
a mainly domestic client base found this explanation of price inertia more appealing than did
ﬁrms with a largely export-based clientele (Table B.6). This is not surprising: domestic clients
should be more likely to have expectations conditioned by the central bank’s target and/or recent
inﬂation experience.
4.2.10 Sticky information
While much has been said of theories that hold some promise as useful explanations of price
stickiness, a practical goal of this approach is to highlight theories that may need to be
reconsidered. Some see the ongoing proliferation of new sticky-price theories as a major problem:
“there is not shortage of theories of sticky prices. Indeed, the problem is precisely the opposite:
we have an embarrassingly long list from which to choose” (Blinder et al. 1998, 17).
Of the ten theories tested, one in particular stands out for its low recognition among ﬁrms. Sticky
information is most closely associated with Mankiw and Ries (2001), who propose that
information about the state of the macroeconomy and a ﬁrm’s market diffuses slowly. While
prices are constantly changing in this model, the pricing decision made by ﬁrms is not always
based on current information, since only a fraction of ﬁrms update their information set in any
given period. Other ﬁrms continue to set prices based on an outdated set of information.
This explanation was accepted as a possible reason for price stickiness by only 13.5 per cent of
the sample of ﬁrms surveyed—the lowest acceptance rate (Table 14, Question C1). Of the ﬁrms
recognizing the theory, a single ﬁrm in the sample of 170 Canadian ﬁrms rated this factor as
‘very’ important and the majority rated it as only ‘slightly’ important. Results from Apel, Friberg,
and Hallsten (2001) support the view that information gathering costs are relatively small. Firms
in that survey of Swedish ﬁrms ranked ‘information-gathering costs’29 thirteenth out of thirteen
theories of price inertia.
29. Theexactstatementfortheinformation-gatheringcoststheorypresentedtoasampleofSwedishﬁrms
is: ‘Itis costly interms oftime and/ormoney to gather relevantinformationfor pricingdecisions.’34
Other evidence gathered in our survey of Canadian ﬁrms also suggests a limited role for sticky
information. All ﬁrms were asked how frequently the main information used to set prices was
updated and how current this information was when it was used to set prices (Table 14,
Questions B8 and B9). A surprisingly high portion of ﬁrms indicated they receive very timely
information. About half of the sample received information with no lag (real time), and a
signiﬁcant portion of these ﬁrms actually received advance knowledge of their main information
with certainty.30 The most common frequencies for information updates were daily (24 per cent),
monthly (21 per cent), and weekly (17 per cent). Even among ﬁrms accepting sticky information,
the majority believe information technology has made sticky information less relevant over the
past decade (Table 14, Question C2). When asked if they would change prices more frequently if
information was available more frequently, about half said they would not (Table 14,
Question C3).
Table 14: Key Questions & Results, Sticky Information
Question Survey questions and key results
B8 How frequently is the main information you use in forming pricing decisions updated? [n=170,
entire sample]
Daily (24%)     Weekly (17%)     Monthly (21%)     Quarterly (16%)     Annually (10%)
Sporadically (12%)
B9 How current is the information when you receive it? [n=170, entire sample]
real time, no lag (50%)    <1 day old (8%)     <1 week old (14%)
<1 month old (16%)     <1 quarter old (9%)     > 1 quarter old (2%)
C1 “The information used to review (and ultimately change) prices is available infrequently. There-
fore, prices may be slow to adjust to new conditions.” Does the statement apply to your ﬁrm?
[n=170, entire sample]
No (86%)    Yes, slightly important (9%)    Yes, fairly important (4%)    Yes, very important (1%)
C2 Has information technology made this factor less relevant over the past 10 years? [n=23, ﬁrms
replying ‘yes’ to C1]
yes (61%)   no (39%)
C3 Would you change prices more quickly or more often if information was available more fre-
quently? [n=23, ﬁrms replying ‘yes’ to C1]
yes (48%)   no (52%)
Note: This table summarizes key questions and corresponding results for a speciﬁc theory. Questions and results
are presented in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire. A copy of the full questionnaire is provided in
Appendix A.
30. A signiﬁcant portion of the 85 ﬁrms reporting real-time information used in forming their pricing
decision actually received advanced information (such as quotes from subcontractors or wage
agreementsfrom labour).35
Small ﬁrms have higher recognition rates for this theory (Table B.8) and are also more likely than
their large counterparts to receive infrequent updates of information used to set prices. It seems
clear that small ﬁrms face costs that limit their price-setting frequency, and that these costs are
related to the price review. Information-gathering costs and price re-optimization costs, such as
management time and effort, are particularly heavy for small ﬁrms because they cannot be spread
over many units of production. To the limited extent that it applies, sticky information makes the
most sense for small ﬁrms.
5. Conclusions
5.1  Summary of key results
5.1.1 Price ﬂexibility
This survey of the price-setting behaviour of a representative sample of 170 Canadian ﬁrms has
several interesting ﬁndings. For one, ﬁrms show a wide variation in the frequency with which they
adjust prices. While one-third adjust prices once a year or less, a similar portion adjust prices
more than twelve times per year. Overall, results indicate that, for the portion of the economy we
surveyed,31 half of Canadian ﬁrms changed prices at least once every three months. Compared
with previous ﬁndings in surveys of a similar nature, our ﬁndings suggest more ﬂexibility in
prices. Many previous surveys found a median of one or two price changes per year. Our results,
however, do conform closely to those found by Bils and Klenow (2002).
In addition to asking ﬁrms about the frequency with which prices are adjusted today, we probed
ﬁrms about changes in the price-setting frequency over time. On this issue, the survey has found
evidence of increased price ﬂexibility among Canadian ﬁrms over the past decade. Much of the
increase in price ﬂexibility is attributed to the intensiﬁcation of competition over the past decade
and the greater use of information technologies, such as so-called yield-management techniques,
which reduce the lump-sum costs of reviewing prices.
Some of the wide variation in reported price-setting behaviour can be explained by the
characteristics and circumstances that ﬁrms reported to interviewers. For example, small ﬁrms set
prices far less frequently than do large ﬁrms. Firms in service sectors, with their heavy reliance on
wages as a key determinant of prices, were mostly likely to set prices annually—often
synchronized to annual wage settlements. On the other hand, wholesalers and retailers were most
31. The survey aimed to be representative of the private, for-proﬁt, unregulated, and non-commodity
producingsegment of theCanadian economy.36
likely to have ﬂexibility in prices—their median price change frequency is seven price changes
per year. Other factors were also found to be important. For example, ﬁrms with the majority of
their sales from international exports reported much more ﬂexibility in their prices. Firms with
more than ﬁve competitors also reported signiﬁcantly more ﬂexibility in prices.
5.1.2 Reasons for price stickiness
Beyond understanding how ﬁrms set prices, this study was equally concerned with understanding
the reasons for price inertia. In particular, ﬁrms reacted favourably to the idea that prices do not
change until a ﬁrm has seen its costs change. This theory (cost-based pricing) also scored well as
a theory of price stickiness in other similar surveys (see Table 15). Firms were also concerned
about adjusting prices ahead of their competition. In addition, some ﬁrms using sales contracts
said they hold nominal prices ﬁxed regardless of market conditions that would otherwise call for a
change in price.
These theories as to why proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms may keep prices unchanged despite pressures to
adjust them seem to have a common genesis: the ﬁrms’ fears of antagonizing customers or
disturbing the goodwill or reputation developed with customers. The theory of customer relations
was the second most popular choice overall, and was accepted by three-quarters of ﬁrms with the
stickiest prices (Table 13).
Given that customers are more likely to be antagonized by a price hike than a price cut, one would
expect fewer rigidities in cutting prices than raising prices. Firms were queried about these
possible asymmetries. Evidence suggests that ﬁrms may face more price inertia when
experiencing upward price pressures than when experiencing downward price pressures.37
On the issue of price-setting asymmetries speciﬁcally, and other ﬁndings more generally,
however, the results must be treated with caution. The survey was gathered at a speciﬁc moment
in the economic cycle. One could imagine that asymmetries, and other ﬁndings, could be sensitive
to the cycle of the economy and prone to the timing of the survey.
5.2 Implications and areas for further research
Some implications of these results are worth considering despite the caveats cited above. If, as we
have found in this survey, prices in Canada are relatively ﬂexible and have become more ﬂexible
over time, inﬂation may be more responsive to interest rate changes. Thus, inﬂation targets could
be achieved with shorter lags and with less impact on activity in the real economy. Moreover,
greater ﬂexibility not only reduces the effects of monetary policy on the real economy, but also
reduces the need for counter-cyclical policy.
The asymmetrical response of prices to changes in economic conditions (i.e., more ﬂexibility
downward than upward) also has implications for the conduct of monetary policy. For one, this
result runs counter to recent concerns that prices, wages in particular, are more sticky downwards
Table 15: Comparing Results from the Bank of Canada Survey with Three Previous Studies
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* Not surveyed in the Bank of Canada study
** Rankings for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canadian studies are based upon the percentage of ﬁrms that
recognized a particular theory. In the Canadian study, mean scores could only be calculated for the six main theories, and
the rankings are identical to those based on percentage recognition.38
than upwards. Similar asymmetries and implications are also found by Blinder et al. (1998, 310)—
these asymmetries suggest that expansionary monetary policy may be more effective at ending
recessions than contractionary policy is at causing them.
While these results are compelling, they require further validation. For one, these survey results
say nothing about wages directly, and this is where downward rigidities are thought to be most
important. In addition, concerns about response burden explicitly limited the survey’s
investigation of price asymmetries. Further research on wage-determination and price-
determination asymmetries would be quite valuable.39
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Appendix A
2002/03Price-Setting Survey Questionnaire
The survey on the following pages is reproduced exactly how participants received it.42
About the Survey
The Bank of Canada’s monetary policy aims to support solid economic growth by keeping inﬂation low, stable and pre-
dictable. The purpose of this study is to help the Bank better understand the current pricing practices of Canadian
ﬁrms. Economists have many theories as to how ﬁrms decide to set prices. This study tests these theories in practice
and attempts to identify trends in how prices are set.
The survey is divided into three sections. Section A addresses basic questions about your ﬁrm and its main products
and services. We encourage you to review this section before you meet with our interviewer. Section B gathers infor-
mation on pricing behaviour and factors inﬂuencing pricing decisions. Section C addresses factors that may lead to
delays in price adjustments. You may wish to read these sections before the interview, but this is not necessary.
Finally, although the Bank of Canada is subject to the Access to Information Act, please be assured that no private
information will be released to the public. If you have any questions please contact your interviewer by phone or e-mail
at the address listed below.
Your Interviewer: David Amirault, phone: 1-800-417-0144, email: damirault@bankofcanada.ca
EXPLANATION OF SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
Representative Business Line
Since your ﬁrm likely sells many different types of goods and services, it will be difﬁcult to generalize questions based
on each. For this reason, we would like you to consider one of your main business lines when answering these ques-
tions. Furthermore, if your ﬁrm has both domestic and international sales, please answer all questions with speciﬁc
reference to Canadian markets.
Firm or Company
If your ﬁrm is a holding company for two or more different types of business, choose the business type that accounts
for the largest portion of revenues or for which you feel most comfortable answering questions.
Price
By price we mean the actual transaction sales price, not the list price. Therefore, if discounts from the list price are
common in your industry, refer to the after-discount price of your good or service. If you have different prices for differ-
ent types of customers, base your answer on the most common type of customer.
Surveying Different Types of Firms
The survey is designed to be answered by ﬁrms of many sizes in different sectors of the economy. If you are unable to
answer a question, please provide as much information as you can to the interviewer on the date of the survey. Our
staff are trained to interpret these questions for speciﬁc ﬁrms and industries.
Services and Customized Products
Final transaction prices in certain industries offering customized products may be largely a function of the work
involved. If this applies to your ﬁrm, refer to your hourly or daily charge out rate as the transaction price.
Fixed and Variable Costs
Fixed costs remain constant regardless of the volume of production, while variable costs ﬂuctuate with production lev-
els.43
Date (Survey collected) _________________
Section A: About your ﬁrm and its main products
COMPANY INFORMATION
A1. Region [ ] Atlantic Canada [ ] Quebec [ ] Ontario [ ] Prairies [ ] British Columbia
A2. Company name _______________________________ Phone number _____________________
A3. Contact name _________________________________ Title _____________________________
A4. Product / Service / Business line _____________________________________ Please answer all questions
based on this category
PRICE FLEXIBILITY
A5. Do you face constraints on the prices you set?
[ ] No constraint [ ] Legal/Regulatory [  ] Common International Price [ ] Parent Company Directive
EMPLOYMENT LEVELS
A6. Number of Employees __________________
COST TRENDS
A7. Approximately what percentage of main product costs are variable ______%  versus ﬁxed _______ %
SALES DISTRIBUTION  (report approximate percentages in blank spaces)
A8. Home Region ________ % Other Can. _________ % U. S. ________ % Other Int.  _________ %
A9. Households ________ % Businesses ________ % Other (Govt./Inst.) ________ %
A10. Contract Sales _________ %    Non-contract sales ________ %
A11. To the best of your knowledge, have the contract vs. non-contract proportions changed signiﬁcantly compared
with a decade ago? If so, which has gained importance in total sales over the decade?
[ ] No, roughly the same percentages [ ] Yes, contract sales have gained [ ] Yes, non-contract sales have gained
A12. Approximate sale percentages to the ﬁve largest buyers of your main product today.
[ ] <10% [ ] 11-25% [ ] 26-50% [ ] 50%<
A13. Approximate sale percentages to the ﬁve largest buyers of your main product a decade ago.
[ ] <10% [ ] 11-25% [ ] 26-50% [ ] 50%<
A14. How many direct competitors do you face for this business line?  _________
A15. Do you face [ ] more, [ ] fewer or the [ ] same number of direct competitors compared with a decade ago?
A16. Is there a price leader in your industry? [ ] Yes / [ ] No
A17. If so, is your ﬁrm considered the price leader? [ ] Yes / [ ] No44
Section B: The pricing decision
FREQUENCY OF PRICE REVIEWS AND ADJUSTMENTS
B1. For your main product, how frequently are pricing decisions reviewed?
[ ] Daily         [ ] Weekly      [ ] Monthly      [ ] Quarterly        [ ] Annually
[ ] Sporadically          [ ] In response to speciﬁc event (specify) ___________________________________________
B2. If you answered “sporadically” or “in response to speciﬁc event”, how
many times have pricing decisions been reviewed in the last 12 months?    __________________
B3. In the last 12 months how many times have you actually adjusted prices?   __________________
B4. To the best of your knowledge, has the frequency of price adjustments changed in the past decade?
[ ] No, it has not changed [ ] Yes, we change prices more frequently [ ] Yes, we change prices less frequently
B5. If yes, why?____________________________________________________________________
REASONS FOR PRICE CHANGES
B6. For your main product/service, how important is each of the following factors in motivating price adjustments
(check the most appropriate box)?
B7. What other factor(s) not listed above motivate price adjustments?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
INFORMATION USED TO SET PRICES
B8. How frequently is the main information you use in forming your pricing decisions updated?
[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Annually [ ] Sporadically
B9. How current is the information when you receive it?
[ ] real time (no lag) [ ] < 1 day old [ ] < 1 week old [ ] < 1 month old [ ] < 1 quarter old [ ] > 1 quarter old.











We routinely change prices at regular intervals
Changes in wage costs
Changes in other domestic inputs
Changes in taxes, fees and other charges
Price changes by competitors
Changes in exchange rates
Changes in demand for product/service
Changes in economic/inﬂation forecast
Sales campaigns
Directives from parent company45
EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES (the exchange rate means the Canada/U.S. exchange rate)
B10.  Do you import/export intermediate inputs or ﬁnished goods?  [ ] Yes/ [ ] No If no, skip to Section C
B11. Which statement best exempliﬁes the immediate impact of an exchange rate depreciation on your ﬁrm’s margin.
[ ] signiﬁcant [ ] moderate [ ] no signiﬁcant             [ ] moderate                [ ] signiﬁcant
    negative effect negative effect effect                               positive effect             positive effect
If “negative effect”, answer B 13 onward        If  “no signiﬁcant/positive effect”, answer B12 & B17
B12.  Have higher U.S. dollar margins diverted sales or investment from Canadian to foreign markets?  [ ] Yes/ [ ] No
B13. Faced with a smaller margin because of a depreciating dollar, rank the following in order of their importance as a
means of restoring margins in recent years. (Rank Top 3, 1=Most important, 2=second most important, 3=third most important)
[   ] increase selling prices                             [   ] shift input to non-U.S. supplier     [   ] reduce other input costs
[ ] increase productivity or volumes of activity [ ] reduce other costs __________________________________
[  ] other means of restoring margin ________________________________________________________________
B14. On average, how much of your proﬁt margin have you recouped in the 12 months following a depreciation?
[ ] virtually none [ ] less than half   [ ] about half     [ ] more than half [ ] virtually all [ ] Don’t know
B15. How much does the exchange rate depreciate before you would adjust prices?
[ ] < 5% [ ] 5% to 10% [ ] 10% to 20% [ ] 20% to 30% [ ] >30% [ ] not applicable/don’t know
B16. Are foreign exchange costs more difﬁcult to pass on to consumers now than a decade ago?
[ ] Yes / [ ] No  If yes, why?  (Choose all applicable)
[  ] competition from domestic sources
[  ] competition from foreign sources
[  ] fewer buyers exert more power on our ﬁrm to keep prices down
[  ] low inﬂation makes price increases more visible and more difﬁcult to justify
[  ] other factors (specify)______________________________________________________________________
B17.  During signiﬁcant exchange rate depreciation, do suppliers reduce their price to offset part of the higher import
cost?
[ ] No, no offset [ ] Yes, infrequently [ ] Yes, often [ ] Yes, but I don’t know how often.46
Section C: Factors leading to delays in price adjustments
This section deals with potential theories as to why price adjustments may be delayed, although ﬁrms would want to
increase prices. Statements summarizing a factor that may slow price adjustments are written in italics. Each theory is
followed by a series of questions.
Statement A: The information used to review (and ultimately change) prices is available infrequently. There-
fore, prices may be slow to adjust to new conditions.
C1. Does this statement apply to your ﬁrm?
[ ] No [ ] Yes, slightly [ ] Yes, fairly [ ] Yes, very
(Skip to Statement B1)  important important important
C2. Has information technology made this factor less relevant over the past 10 years? [ ] Yes / [ ] No
C3. Would you change prices more quickly or more often if information was available more frequently? [ ] Yes / [ ] No
Statement B1: Firms delay price cuts because they don’t want to be the ﬁrst in the industry to cut prices.
C4. Does this statement apply to your ﬁrm?
[ ] No [ ] Yes, slightly [ ] Yes, fairly [ ] Yes, very
(Skip to Statement B2) important important important
C5.  Why does this statement apply to your ﬁrm?  (Choose all applicable)
   [ ] price cuts may trigger a price war [ ] if we cut prices ﬁrst, new business would exceed our capacity
   [ ] lower prices hurt our margins [ ] we worry that the need for a price cut may be temporary
   [ ] other _____________________________________________________
Statement B2: Firms delay raising prices because they don’t want to be the ﬁrst in the industry to raise prices.
C6.  Does this statement apply to your ﬁrm?
[ ] No [ ] Yes, slightly [ ] Yes, fairly [ ] Yes, very
(Skip to Statement C) important important important
C7. Why does the statement apply to your ﬁrm?   (Choose all applicable)
      [ ] cannot sell anything above competitors’ prices       [ ] we would lose too many customers/market share
      [ ] if a competitor raises prices ﬁrst, customers are less upset
      [ ] other  _____________________________________________________
Statement C: Prices depend mainly on the costs of labour and raw materials used in producing goods and
services. Therefore, prices don’t change until costs change.
C8.  Does this statement apply to your ﬁrm?
[ ] No [ ] Yes, slightly [ ] Yes, fairly [ ] Yes, very
(Skip to Statement D) important important important
C9. Are temporary cost increases more difﬁcult to pass into prices than increases viewed as permanent?[ ]Yes/ [ ] No47
C10.  If you foresee an increase in your future costs (such as raw materials), do you  (Choose any of the following)
[ ] buy in advance and store in inventory       [ ] hedge against cost increases    [ ] raise own prices in anticipation
[ ] take no action
C11. If you take no action, why?   (Choose all applicable)
      [ ] It would antagonize our customers. [ ] We are not conﬁdent in our forecasts or estimates.
      [ ] We are reluctant to take the lead in raising prices. [ ] We can easily raise prices when actually required.
Statement D: Firms would like to adjust prices more often to reﬂect market conditions, but ﬁxed-price con-
tracts make it difﬁcult to pass on price increases when a contract is active.
C12.  Does this statement apply to your ﬁrm?
[ ] No [ ] Yes, slightly [ ] Yes, fairly [ ] Yes, very
(Skip to Statement E) important important important
C13. Do contracts prevent prices from decreasing when demand or costs fall? [ ] Yes / [ ] No
C14. Do you offer discounts on posted contract prices? [ ] Yes / [ ] No
C15. What is the average period of time over which prices are ﬁxed in contracts? ______________
C16. Is this period generally [ ] longer, [ ] shorter or [ ] the same, compared to 10 years ago?
Statement E: Firms delay price increases because they have an implied understanding with customers that
they will not raise prices in tight markets.
C17.  Does this statement apply to your ﬁrm?
[ ] No [ ] Yes, slightly [ ] Yes, fairly [ ] Yes, very
(Skip to Question C19)        important                             important   important
C18. Does the opposite hold true in weak markets (customers less likely to demand price concessions)? [ ] Yes /[]N o
FINAL COMMENTS
C19.  Are there other compelling arguments as to why prices adjust slowly?  (Choose all applicable)
[ ] It would be too costly to change prices more often (time, effort, out-of-pocket costs).
[ ] Factors inﬂuencing prices do not change often enough to warrant changes.
[ ] Prices could not change more often without disturbing customer relations.
[ ] We are more likely to amend product characteristics (e.g. warranty, delivery lag) than prices.
[ ] Low inﬂation makes large price changes more noticeable.
[ ] other _____________________________________________________________________________________
C20. Generally, are prices more difﬁcult to adjust than they were a decade ago? [ ] Yes / [ ] No / [ ] I Don’t Know
If Yes, why? ___________________________________________________________________________________
C21. To what extent to your reponses regarding your main product also represent your other product lines?
[ ] Mostly representative [ ] Not representative [ ] Not applicable, company has only one product.48
Appendix B
RecognitionRates ofPrice-Stickiness Theoriesby FirmCharacteristic
This appendix reviews how ﬁrm characteristics, which were collected in Section A of the price-
setting survey questionnaire, influence the selection of a particular theory of price stickiness.
F-tests and t-tests were used to determine whether responses to a speciﬁc theory of price
stickiness were statistically different between groups of ﬁrms, each sharing a speciﬁc
characteristic.
Analysis was carried out across eight ﬁrm characteristics: industry sector, number of competitors,
buyer concentration, portion of sales to households, variable cost structure, export sales portion,
price reviewing behaviour, and size of ﬁrm. Thus, we tested, for example, whether the recognition
rates of smaller ﬁrms to a particular price theory were statistically different from those for larger
ﬁrms, or whether the response of ﬁrms with more competitors was different from those with fewer
competitors.
Of course, test results are sensitive to sample size and the number of groups. The larger the
number of groups, the smaller are the individual group sample sizes and the less successful are the
tests in identifying statistical differences between means that may appear to be quite large. It is
also important to realize that because this is a univariate analysis, there is always the possibility
that observed correlations may be due to a missing variable. Multivariate analysis will be used in























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a. A triple asterisk indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level. A double asterisk















Sticky information 13.5 14.7 8.3 16.7 0.8 0.445 None
Coordination failure -
falling prices
31.2 30.9 25.0 37.0 0.9 0.428 None
Coordination failure -
rising prices
41.2 33.8 47.9 44.4 1.3 0.268 None
Cost-based pricing 67.1 80.9 56.3 59.3 5.2*** 0.007 1&2***
1&3***
Explicit contracts 45.3 42.6 43.8 50.0 0.4 0.701 None
Implicit contracts 31.8 30.9 37.5 27.8 0.6 0.568 None
Menu costs 21.2 26.5 16.7 18.5 1.0 0.381 None
Factors do not change 31.1 32.4 37.5 24.1 1.1 0.336 None
Non-price competition 44.1 42.6 45.8 44.4 0.1 0.943 None
Customer relations 55.3 52.9 54.2 59.3 0.3 0.774 None
Low inﬂation 33.5 39.7 43.8 16.7 5.4*** 0.005 1&3***
2&3***51




Share of sales accounted for
by the 5 largest buyers
F-test
valuesa
a. A triple asterisk indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level. A double asterisk
















Sticky information 13.5 12.5 15.4 12.8 0.1 0.896 None
Coordination failure -
falling prices
31.2 37.5 34.6 25.6 1.1 0.346 None
Coordination failure -
rising prices
41.2 37.5 44.2 41.0 0.2 0.812 None
Cost-based pricing 67.1 82.5 71.2 56.4 4.5*** 0.012 1&3***
Explicit contracts 45.3 70.0 48.1 30.8 9.07*** 0.000 1&2**
2&3***
Implicit contracts 31.8 35.0 28.8 32.1 0.2 0.821 None
Menu costs 21.2 25.0 17.3 21.8 0.4 0.663 None
Factors do not change 31.1 30.0 26.9 34.6 0.4 0.644 None
Non-price competi-
tion
44.1 35.0 40.4 51.3 2.1 0.130 None
Customer relations 55.3 55.0 59.6 52.6 0.3 0.734 None
Low inﬂation 33.5 27.5 38.5 33.3 0.4 0.688 None
Other 13.5 7.5 19.2 12.8 1.4 0.260 None52







a. A triple asterisk indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level. A double asterisk











Sticky information 13.5 16.3 11.1 1.0 0.331
Coordination failure - falling
prices
31.2 25.0 36.7 2.7* 0.102
Coordination failure - rising
prices
41.2 38.8 43.3 0.4 0.547
Cost-based pricing 67.1 60.0 73.3 3.4** 0.066
Explicit contracts 45.3 35.0 54.4 6.6*** 0.011
Implicit contracts 31.8 36.3 27.8 1.4 0.239
Menu costs 21.2 28.8 14.4 5.3*** 0.023
Factors do not change 31.2 36.3 26.7 1.8 0.180
Non-price competition 44.1 51.3 37.8 3.1** 0.078
Customer relations 55.3 61.3 50.0 2.2* 0.143
Low inﬂation 33.5 35.0 32.2 0.2 0.70453
Table B.5: Percentage Recognition of Pricing Theory by Variable Costs as








a. A triple asterisk indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level. A double asterisk




















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sticky information 13.5 5.0 13.9 15.4 14.5 0.5 0.699 None
Coordination fail-
ure - falling prices
31.2 35.0 36.1 32.7 25.8 0.5 0.703 None
Coordination fail-
ure - rising prices
41.2 35.0 41.7 44.2 40.3 0.2 0.913 None
Cost-based pricing 67.1 40.0 58.3 69.2 79.0 4.2*** 0.007 1&3*
1&4***
Explicit contracts 45.3 55.0 36.1 42.3 46.8 0.7 0.549 None
Implicit contracts 31.8 30.0 44.4 25.0 30.6 1.3 0.284 None
Menu costs 21.2 20.0 27.8 21.2. 17.7 0.5 0.712 None
Factors do not
change
31.2 55.0 25.0 28.8 29.0 2.1 0.103 None
Non-price competi-
tion
44.1 45.0 55.6 42.3 38.7 0.9 0.443 None
Customer relations 55.3 45.0 61.1 55.8 54.8 0.4 0.720 None
Low inﬂation 33.5 25.0 36.1 32.7 35.5 0.3 0.833 None54







a. A triple asterisk indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level. A double asterisk









50% or more of
sales
n=33
Sticky information 13.5 12.4 18.2 0.8 0.387
Coordination failure -
falling prices
31.2 32.8 24.2 0.9 0.341
Coordination failure -
rising prices
41.2 43.8 30.3 2.0 0.159
Cost-based pricing 67.1 68.6 60.6 0.8 0.383
Explicit contracts 45.3 42.3 57.6 2.5* 0.11
Implicit contracts 31.8 30.7 36.4 0.4 0.530
Menu costs 21.2 23.4 12.1 2.0 0.158
Factors do not change 31.2 34.3 18.2 3.2** 0.073
Non-price competition 44.1 47.4 30.3 3.2** 0.076
Customer relations 55.3 56.2 51.5 0.2 0.629
Low inﬂation 33.5 36.5 21.2 2.8** 0.09655
Table B.7: Percentage Recognition of Pricing Theory by Pricing Behaviour







a. A triple asterisk indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level. A double







b. State-dependent ﬁrms are those that said they review pricing decisions either sporadically or in




c. Time-dependent ﬁrms are those that said they review pricing decisions at regular time intervals
(daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annually).
Sticky information 13.5 17.5 11.5 1.2 0.280
Coordination failure - falling prices 31.2 31.6 31.0 0.0 0.936
Coordination failure - rising prices 41.2 42.1 40.7 0.0 0.862
Cost-based pricing 67.1 64.9 68.9 0.2 0.675
Explicit contracts 45.3 52.6 41.6 1.9 0.174
Implicit contracts 31.8 28.1 33.6 0.5 0.465
Menu costs 21.2 14.0 24.8 2.6* 0.107
Factors do not change 31.2 33.3 30.1 0.2 0.669
Non-price competition 44.1 36.8 47.8 1.8 0.177
Customer relations 55.3 45.6 60.2 3.3** 0.072
Low inﬂation 33.5 28.1 36.3 1.1 0.28756













a. A triple asterisk indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5% level. A double asterisk
indicates rejection at the 10% level. A single asterisk indicates rejection at the 15% level.








Sticky information 13.5 20.4 6.3 13.2 2.2 0.115 1&2**
Coordination failure -
falling prices
31.2 29.6 35.4 29.4 0.3 0.759 None
Coordination failure -
rising prices
41.2 38.9 45.8 39.7 0.3 0.742 None
Cost-based pricing 67.1 74.1 66.7 61.8 1.0 0.360 None
Explicit contracts 45.3 35.2 58.3 44.1 2.8 0.062 1&2**
Implicit contracts 31.8 31.5 33.3 30.9 0.0 0.961 None
Menu costs 21.2 27.8 16.7 19.1 1.1 0.343 None
Factors do not change 31.1 38.9 20.8 32.4 2.0 0.142 1&2*
Non-price competi-
tion
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